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Introduction
Before the turn of the century, international migration
had an extremely low profile on the global development
agenda. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
for example, make no mention at all of international
migration. Although a number of studies have attempted
to “mainstream” migration into the MDGs after the fact, it
is still largely ignored in official assessments of progress
made towards them (Usher, 2005; Crush and Frayne 2007;
Skeldon, 2008). According to the United Nations (UN), the
silence surrounding migration in the MDGs was because it
was too divisive and sensitive an issue between developed
and developing countries (United Nations Population
Fund [UNFPA], 2005). At the time, cooperation between
North and South on the governance of migration more
broadly seemed highly unlikely. Nation states in the North
increasingly believed that their territorial sovereignty
was under threat from irregular migration from the
South, and states in the South saw their development
prospects undermined by a crippling “brain drain” to
the North. Repeated efforts by the UN to convene an
international conference on migration in the late 1990s
were unsuccessful.
Since 2000, however, international migration has moved
to the top of the global governance agenda and a whole
range of bilateral and multilateral partnerships have taken
shape (Koser, 2010; Newland, 2010; Betts, 2011; Hansen,
Koehler and Money, 2011; Koslowski, 2011; Kunz, Lavenex
and Pannizon, 2011). This process began with various
initiatives within the UN, notably the 2003 Doyle Report
to Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his appointment
of a special rapporteur on migration and development.
Outside the UN, discussions about international migration
gathered momentum with the appointment of the Global
Commission on International Migration (GCIM) and the
first UN High Level Dialogue (HLD) on International
Migration and Development in 2006 (GCIM, 2005; UN,
2006). In 2007, the first meeting of the new Global Forum
on Migration and Development (GFMD) was convened
in Brussels. This was followed by annual meetings in
the Philippines in 2008; Greece in 2009; Mexico in 2010;
Switzerland in 2011; and Mauritius in 2012.
The GFMD is a state‐led, voluntary, non‐binding
consultative process open to all member states and observer
states of the UN (Omelianuk, 2008; 2012; Newland, 2012).
In 2009, the major UN agencies, plus the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), combined to form the
Global Migration Group (GMG) with a brief to “promote
the wider application of all relevant international and
regional instruments and norms relating to migration,
and to encourage the adoption of more coherent,
comprehensive and better coordinated approaches to the
issue of international migration” (GMG, 2012). In 2010, the
GMG issued a handbook for states with recommendations

on how to mainstream migration into their development
planning and vice-versa (GMG, 2010).
Another notable feature of the “new optimism” around
international migration is the growth of cooperation on the
issue within and between regional blocs of states. Regional
consultative processes (RCPs) on migration, for example,
now exist in many parts of the globe (Thouez and Channac,
2006; Hansen, 2010). While the original focus of many
RCPs was migration management, issues of migration
and development grew increasingly on their agendas. In
Southern Africa, for example, the Migration Dialogue for
Southern Africa (MIDSA) was founded by IOM and SAMP
as a non-binding consultative forum for Southern African
Development Community (SADC) states in 2002 and
meets on an annual basis. Originally focussed on regional
cooperation in managed migration, the MIDSA agenda has
been increasingly shaped by migration and development
issues. In addition to the RCPs, geographically dispersed
blocs of states also moved migration and development
higher on their lists of priorities: these include the
Commonwealth, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, the African Union (AU) and
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States
(AU, 2006a; AU, 2006b; ACP, 2010; Gagnon and KhoudourCastéras, 2011; de Boeck, 2012; Melde, 2012; OECD, 2012;
Ramphal Institute, 2012).
The most recent trend is the emergence of increased
dialogue and cooperation on international migration
between blocs of states. The European Union (EU) has been
a central player in many of these initiatives. Following the
adoption of its Global Approach to Migration (GAM) in
2005, the EU pursued “mobility partnerships” with major
migrant-sending regions and countries (Parkes, 2009;
Devisscher, 2011; Reslow, 2012). In relation to Africa, the
Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and
Development, held in Rabat, Morocco in July 2006, was
followed by the Joint EU-AU Declaration on Migration
and Development in Tripoli, Libya in November that
year.1 One of the outcomes of the declaration is the
recent Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and
Employment (MME). The MME partnership commits the
parties to dialogue on a broad range of issues, including
diasporas; remittances; brain drain; migrant rights; the
social consequences of migration; regular, circular and
irregular migration; visa issues; smuggling and trafficking
of migrants; readmission and return; refugee protection;
the mobility of students; and harmonization processes.
The partnership’s current 12-point action plan includes
the establishment of an African Institute for Remittances
in Addis Ababa, the implementation of the Ouagadougou
Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings and
the Diaspora Outreach Initiative.
1

See: www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdfb010.html.
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In the space of a decade, how and why has migration
shifted from being an issue that was of marginal interest
on the international development agenda to one that
is increasingly at its centre? How has one of the most
contentious North-South issues of the 1990s become
the focus of so much bilateral and multilateral dialogue
and cooperation between them? The first section of this
paper provides a possible answer to these questions,
which provides a context for understanding the nature of
cooperation between the EU and ACP Group of States on
international migration governance.

From Threat to Lever
Most existing discussions about EU migration policy
towards states and regions outside of it emphasize the
threat of in-migration to “Fortress Europe” as the driving
concern (Geddes, 1999; 2012; Albrecht, 2002; Caviedes,
2004; Gebrewold-Tochalo, 2007; Luedkte, 2009). This
“fortress” or “migration as threat” perspective is inwardlooking and control-oriented in its policy outcomes, and is
inherently unlikely to garner any sympathy from migrantsending states in the South. As Geddes points out, framing
the issue in terms of the “threat” of migration is a “cause of
irritation” to African countries, particularly as those same
countries see that EU countries are only too willing to
open their doors to skilled migrants, “draining the brains”
of Africa and the rest of the global South (Geddes, 2012:
406). The “migration-as-threat” policy approach provides
little basis for dialogue and cooperation between migrantsending and migrant-receiving states, as the experience of
the 1990s made all too clear.
Over the last decade, however, international migration has
increasingly been reframed as a development issue. One of
the consequences of this reframing is that states formerly
at loggerheads now have a common language and the
appearance of complementary interests on migration
management (Lahav, 2008). After all, no one disputes
that “development” is a good thing for the South; thus,
anything that enhances development should be viewed
in a similarly positive light. While many states continue
to view migration primarily through a security lens, the
overall result has been the emergence of an alternative
“migration-as-development lever” perspective, which has
laid the basis for new forms of inter-regional cooperation
and dialogue. Understanding this global shift in thinking
is essential to an analysis of the nature and content of
EU-ACP cooperation on international migration. The
migration-as-development lever discourse contains at
least five points of agreement around which the interests
of regional blocs in the North and South have coalesced.
The first point of agreement is that poverty and a lack
of development are the “root causes” of international
migration. Instead of erecting barricades to migrants, an
alternative policy approach is to remove the incentive to
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move in the first place. The only way to do this effectively
is through poverty reduction and economic development
in the source regions of the South. The root causes doctrine
is an article of faith in EU policy circles and is also perfectly
palatable in the South, since its logical consequence is
increased flows of foreign direct investment and official
development assistance:
The primary challenge is to tackle the main
push factors for migration: poverty and
lack of employment opportunities. The
EU must recognise that creating jobs in
developing countries could significantly
reduce migratory pressure from Africa.
Migrants should be supported in
contributing to the development of
their countries of origin…Promoting
investments in labour-intensive sectors
in regions with high outward migration
will be an important priority, in a wider
context of facilitating intra-African
labour migration and mobility. (European
Commission [EC], 2006: 5-6)
Climate change has recently been added to the list of root
causes of migration (Brown, 2008; Martin, 2010; Piguet,
Pécoud and de Guchtenaire, 2011). Despite the fact that
the root causes argument has many academic critics who
contend that economic development actually increases
migration and mobility, it remains a shared policy belief
and the conceptual foundation of much inter-regional
cooperation (Gent, 2002; Lindstrøm, 2005; de Haas, 2007;
Castles and van Hear, 2011).
The second point of agreement is that migrant remittances
from North to South have positive short- and long-term
development implications for the migrant-sending
countries, communities and households (Kapur, 2004;
Bali and Balli, 2011; Gupta, Patillo and Wagh, 2009;
Mundaca, 2009; Ratha et al., 2011). In 2012, officially
recorded global remittance flows exceeded US$400 billion,
80 percent of which went to developing countries. In the
South, remittance inflows are now three times as high
as official development assistance. Remittance outflows
from EU countries reached US$108 billion in 2008, up
from US$29 billion in 2000. While no one disputes the
fact that remittance flows are massive and growing, there
is a vigorous debate on their development impacts and
potential. The consensus in policy circles is that remittances
are a significant source of external finance for developing
countries, but should neither be confused with, nor seen as
a substitute for, official aid (Lindley, 2011). Nevertheless,
remittances are seen as a way of addressing the root
causes of migration, as they reduce poverty and dampen
pressures for out-migration. States in the North and South
not only agree that remittances are a positive outcome of
international migration, but moreover, that their impact on
development can be maximized by reducing, for example,
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transaction costs for migrants through more formal and
accessible remitting channels, and by introducing policies
that promote the development “multiplier effects” of
remittances, such as a growth in savings, investment,
employment and productive activity.
The third point of agreement derives from the observation
that migrants engage in a wide range of activities,
maintaining their linkages with, and contributing to the
development of their countries of origin. In the EU, such
activities once signified a failure of migrant integration;
today, these same migrants are recast as the diaspora, who
often play major roles in the development of their countries
of origin (Nurse, 2004; Plaza and Ratha, 2011; Durutalo,
2012). In other words, the idea that there is a crippling
“brain drain” from the South has been largely replaced
by the idea of engaging diasporas for development. The
AU has even rebranded the African diaspora as the “sixth
region” of the continent and held the first Global African
Diaspora Forum in South Africa in 2012.
Increasingly common worldwide, diaspora engagement
events seek to promote a range of initiatives, such as
collective remitting, philanthropy, tourism, investment
and entrepreneurship, knowledge networks, bonds,
technology transfer and return migration (Kuznetsov, 2006;
Brinkerhoff, 2009; Newland and Tanaka, 2010; Plaza and
Ratha, 2011; Agunias and Newland, 2012). Increasingly,
diasporic communities are even viewed as “development
agents” and “partners” in policy circles in both the North
and South.
The fourth point of agreement is encapsulated in the idea
of “co-development,” which suggests that international
migration is beneficial for all those involved:
True co-development involves sustained
cooperation between receiving nations
and source nations in the management of
both legal and illegal migratory flows. At
the same time, it fosters the economic and
demographic development of both the
sending and the receiving country. This
cooperation is based in large measure on
understanding that, more than ever before,
the best migration policy for developed
nations is one that seeks not to block, but
to smoothly regulate the circulation and
re-circulation of the majority of foreigners
and immigrants. (Weil, 2002)
Co-development, in the form of temporary circular
migration for work, is a “triple win” for all concerned:
temporary labour market needs in the EU are met;
countries of origin receive remittances and new skills
acquired by returning migrants; and migrants themselves
earn income and acquire new knowledge and skills
without “giving up their roots” (de Wenden, 2008;

Newland, 2009; de Bergh, 2009). Circular migration can
also be more easily “sold” to skeptical publics in Europe.
While researchers have criticized the co-development
concept, which suggests that the benefits of migration are
equally shared by states and temporary migrants (who
are, in fact, often highly exploited), the concept itself is
powerful, convincing states in the South that, in meeting
the labour needs of the North, they share its interests.
The fifth and final point of agreement is that intra-regional
freedom of movement is economically beneficial for both
origin and destination states. While this principle is viewed
with skepticism by many states in the North and South, it is
a founding principle in several regional compacts between
groups of states. It has clearly achieved greatest practical
application in the EU, but is also embedded in the founding
documents of regional blocs throughout the ACP, including
the AU, the Economic Community of West African States,
the SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa, the East African Community and the Caribbean
Community. Dogged by individual state opposition and
prevarication, the actual implementation of the principle
has generally been quite limited. Nevertheless, the new
interface between migration and development over the last
decade has given impetus to the idea that the development
of both sending and receiving states in the South will be
enhanced by greater labour mobility across international
borders (Pécoud and de Guchteneire, 2007).
Allied to the argument for policies that facilitate intraregional migration, is the attention now being paid to
South-South migration (Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Bakewell,
2009; Hujo and Piper, 2010; Gagnon and KhoudourCastéras, 2012). On a global scale, South-South migration
is clearly a significant phenomenon. In 2010, for example,
it accounted for one-third of all migrants worldwide (UN,
2012). While South-South migration seems a natural subject
for South-South dialogue and cooperation, its interest
and relevance to the EU are not immediately apparent.
Understanding why the EU might take an interest in
South-South migration is critical if we are to make sense of
the EU-ACP migration relationship.

Mapping Migration
The sources for mapping migration within and from
the ACP Group of States are few and dated. The most
comprehensive source is the University of Sussex
Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization
and Poverty’s Global Migrant Origins Database (GMOD),
which was last updated in 2007. By aggregating the
bilateral flows between countries on a regional basis
from this database, it is possible to draw some general
conclusions about migration that help to explain the
distinctive geographical focus of the EU-ACP migration
relationship. According to the GMOD, a total of 23 million
migrants from ACP countries live outside their country of
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birth (Table 1). Of these, 37 percent are resident in the North
(Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand) and
63 percent are in the global South. Overall, South-South
migration is an extremely significant phenomenon for the
ACP and far more important than migration to the North.
At the same time, the relative importance of South-South
migration varies considerably from region to region and
sub-region to sub-region. In Africa, for example, SouthSouth migrants make up 78 percent of the total of all
migration, compared with only 24 percent in the Pacific

and 15 percent in the Caribbean. The most common
destinations for Caribbean migrants are the United States
and Canada (70 percent of total migration), while Australia
and New Zealand are most important for migrants from
the Pacific region (48 percent of the total). Within Africa,
there is also considerable inter-regional variation in SouthSouth migration, which varies from a high of 83 percent of
migrants in West Africa to a low of 48 percent in Southern
Africa.

Table 1: South-South and South-North Migration from the ACP Group of States, 2007
Region of Origin

Total Number of
Migrants from All
Regions

Total Number of
Migrants to States in
the North

Percentage
of Overall
Migration

Total Number of
Percentage of Overall
Migrants to States in the Migration
South

Southern Africa

888,504

462,022

52.0

426,482

48.0

Eastern Africa

5,520,343

1,468,411

26.6

4,051,932

73.4

West Africa

8,130,420

1,341,519

16.5

6,788,901

83.5

Central Africa

3,007,541

634,591

21.1

2,372,950

78.9

Total Africa

17,546,808

3,906,543

22.3

13,640,265

77.7

Total Caribbean

5,199,538

4,414,408

84.9

785,130

15.1

Total Pacific

466,526

352,694

75.6

113,832

24.4

Total

23,212,872

8,673,645

37.4

14,539,227

62.6

Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from GMOD, 2007.

In both absolute and relative terms, migration from the
ACP countries to the EU seems relatively insignificant,
compared to migration to other regions (Table 2). A total
of 3.5 million ACP migrants (78 percent of whom are from
the African region) live in the EU. However, they make up
only 15 percent of the total number of ACP migrants. In
the case of the Pacific, the figure is as low as 4 percent.
In virtually every ACP region and sub-region, fewer than
20 percent of migrants are in the EU. In West Africa, the
figure is only 11 percent. In other words, despite the high

media profile given to migration from Africa to Europe,
it is only a relatively small component of total African
migration movement. This is enough for some in the EU
to pursue a security-driven fortress agenda and others to
be concerned that the numbers will increase in the future if
the root causes of migration are not addressed; however, it
is certainly insufficient to justify the moral panic often felt
in the EU. Just as important, these figures help to explain
why South-South, rather than ACP-EU, migration has
become a major area of cooperation between the two blocs.

Table 2: Migration from ACP Group of States to the EU, 2007
Region of Origin

Total Number of
Migrants from All
Regions

Number of
Percentage of
Migrants Settling Overall Migration
in the EU

Number of Migrants
Settling Outside the EU

Percentage of Overall
Migration

Southern Africa

888,504

241,293

27.2

647,211

72.8

Eastern Africa

5,520,343

1,021,392

18.5

4,498,951

81.5

West Africa

8,130,420

932,707

11.5

7,197,713

88.5

Central Africa

3,007,541

581,397

19.3

2,426,144

80.7

Total Africa

17,546,808

2,776,789

15.8

14,770,019

84.2

Total Caribbean

5,199,538

760,034

14.6

4,439,504

85.4

Total Pacific

466,526

17,673

3.8

448,853

96.2

Total

23,212,872

3,554,496

15.3

19,658,376

84.7

Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from GMOD, 2007.
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The majority of South-South ACP migration is intraregional, that is, between countries in the same regional
bloc. For example, 12.2 million, or 86 percent of SouthSouth migrants move to another country within the same
ACP region (Table 3). Only 1.9 million (14 percent) move
to non-ACP countries in the South. However, this overall
pattern disguises important inter-regional differences. In
Africa, for example, 90 percent of South-South migrants
move to another ACP state within Africa. The rest migrate
to non-ACP African states (North Africa) and the Middle

East. Extra-regional migration is highest from Eastern
Africa (20 percent) and lowest from West Africa (5
percent). Intra-Caribbean migration, by contrast, makes
up only one-third of South-South migration in that ACP
region. The other two-thirds migrate to Mexico, Central
and South America. In the Pacific, intra-ACP migration is
even less significant (at 10 percent of migration). The major
South-South destination for Pacific islanders tends to be
Southeast Asian countries.

Table 3: Intra-regional Migration Within the ACP Group of States, 2007
Region of Origin

Number of South-South Number of IntraMigrants
regional Migrants

Percentage of
Overall Migration

Number of Extra-regional
Migrants

Percentage of Overall
Migration

Southern Africa

426,482

385,986

90.5

40,496

9.5

Eastern Africa

4,051,932

3,232,712

79.8

819,220

20.2

West Africa

6,788,901

6,435,227

94.8

353,674

5.2

Central Africa

2,372,950

2,237,911

94.3

135,039

5.7

Total Africa

13,640,265

12,291,836

90.1

1,349,429

9.9

Total Caribbean

785,130

266,216

33.9

518,914

66.1

Total Pacific

113,832

11,429

10.0

102,403

90.0

Total

14,539,227

12,569,481

86.4

1,970,746

13.6

Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from GMOD, 2007.

In sum, South-South migration is the most important
form of migration for the ACP as a whole. Intra-regional
migration is also very significant, either to other ACP
states (Africa) or to neighbouring regions in the South
(the Caribbean and the Pacific). The information base on
South-South migration is, however, extremely limited,
and policy making around migration and development
is severely hampered by the paucity of information. As
a result, it is perhaps not surprising that the impetus for
the EU-ACP Group of States’ cooperation on migration
focuses so strongly on South-South migration and on
filling the knowledge gaps that currently exist.

economic and social development of, and reducing
poverty in, the migrants’ regions of origin. In other words,
while the threat of migration was clearly paramount in
EU thinking, the trade-off for cooperation on control was
development assistance to reduce migration flows by
addressing its root causes. One critic has suggested that
this trade-off means that the EU was, in effect, “turning
development aid into a tool for implementing restrictive
and security-driven immigration policies which are at
odds with its commitment to make migration work for
development” (European NGO Confederation for Relief
and Development [CONCORD], 2010).

Developing the Migration
Partnership

In June 2006, the report of the ACP-EU Joint
Parliamentary Assembly noted that it would debate
and make recommendations on “migration issues and
the contribution which it [sic] can make to ways which
will foster development in the countries of origin and to
action designed to counter trafficking in human beings”
(ACP-EU, 2006). That same month, the ACP-EC Council
of Ministers meeting in Papua, New Guinea “concluded
a major agreement on financing the Cotonou Partnership
Agreement” and also “held a debate on migration and
development, reflecting the importance of development
policy in managing trends in migration for the benefit of
both regions of origin and destination” (Council of the
EU, 2006). Clearly influenced by the global reframing
of migration as a development issue, the EU and ACP
initiated a new type of dialogue on the migration file.

The 2000 Cotonou Agreement, which entered into force
in April 2003, provides the framework for cooperation
between the EU and the ACP countries across a broad
range of issues. Article 13 of the agreement specifies that
“[t]he issue of migration shall be the subject of in-depth
dialogue in the framework of the ACP-EU Partnership”
(EC, 2010). What stands out in Article 13 is the focus on
migration control. The parties agree to the deportation of
“illegal immigrants,” including third-country nationals
and, moreover, to develop strategies “aim[ed] at reducing
poverty, improving living and working conditions,
creating employment and developing training contribute
in the long term to normalising migratory flows” (EC,
2010). To that end, the EU committed to supporting the
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Despite considerable pressure, however, the shift was
not reflected in either the 2005 or 2010 revisions to the
Cotonou Agreement, which left Article 13 intact (Koeb and
Hohmeister, 2010). The failure of the EU and ACP to reach
an agreement on a reworded Article 13 resides primarily in
the clause on readmission, which the EU insists should be
binding for all ACP countries. In 2010, a joint declaration
on Article 13 was issued, noting that the two parties had
agreed to strengthen and deepen their dialogue and
cooperation in the area of migration, building on the three
pillars: migration and development, including issues
relating to diasporas, brain drain and remittances; legal
migration, including admission, mobility and movement
of skills and services; and illegal migration, including
smuggling and trafficking of human beings and border
management, as well as readmission. The declaration laid
the groundwork for an ongoing conversation on the first
pillar through the ACP-EU Dialogue on Migration and
Development.
The 2010 dialogue focused on remittances and South-South
migration corridors, including promoting competitiveness
and transparency in the financial products market;
broadening the range of formal channels used to send
and receive remittances; allowing migrants to open bank
accounts in both source and receiving countries; decreasing
the costs of remittances; and promoting education to
enhance the management and development impact of
remittances. The second dialogue in April 2012, however,
reverted to the readmission issue. It was at this meeting
that the deep divisions between the EU and the ACP over
revisions to the security components of Article 13 were
once again apparent.
The degree to which the ACP’s view of migration was
increasingly dominated by the idea of migration as a lever
of development is evident in both the ACP’s 2006 Brussels
Declaration on Asylum, Migration and Mobility, and its
2008 Brussels Resolution on Migration and Development.
The 2006 declaration cites conflicts, poverty, population
growth, poor management, underdevelopment, lack of
opportunities and environmental issues as contributory
factors to migration and asserts that “effective
management of migration requires that these root causes
be examined” (ACP, 2006). In addition, it notes that “the
issue of irregular or forced migration is being addressed
in terms of security considerations, rather than in the
wider context of development that takes account of the
problems of migration in development” (ACP, 2006).
The declaration also contains a section on “The Role of
the Diaspora in Development” and pledges concerted
action (in collaboration with banking institutions, the EU,
and regional and national authorities) to promote “costeffective transfer of funds that are currently dominated
by cash transfer offices, aimed at reducing costs and
eliminating the bias against remittances in national and
regional regulatory systems” and engaging with diaspora
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organizations in schemes that “highlight the positive role
of the Diaspora for channeling their knowledge, skills and
financial resources to their home countries” (ACP, 2006).
The declaration’s plan of action includes the establishment
of an Intra-ACP Migration Facility and the ACP Migration
Observatory.
The 2008 Brussels Resolution on Migration and
Development focusses even more explicitly on migration
as a development issue. The preamble, for example, notes
that migration and mobility programs and principles are
“important instruments for sustainable development”
(ACP, 2008) and contribute to the attainment of the
MDGs. Further, it suggests that there is a need to manage
the root causes, impacts and consequences of migration
while exploiting migration to the benefit of sustainable
development (ibid.). The resolution identifies the following
four areas for action:
• the contribution of migrants and diaspora to
sustainable development, which includes: the
research and promotion of the role of migrants’ and
diasporas’ networks; sharing migration experiences
and its positive aspects, such as the transfer of
technology and enhanced skills and remittances; the
development and promotion of innovative solutions
for curbing illegal migration and brain drain through
“brain gain” and the implementation of flexible
circular migration programs; strengthening national
legal and financial environments for enhancing the
multiplier effects of remittances; and reducing the
cost of transfers “while recognising the private nature
of these funds and that they can never be a substitute
for official development aid”;
• migration and environment, including better analysis
of the nexus between migration and the environment,
especially through research on environmentally
related migration and the environmental impact of
forced migration;
• migration and human security; and
• a consideration of migration in the identification of
development projects and programs (ibid.).
Embedded in the language and actions of the both the
declaration and the resolution are all of the central themes
of the post-2000 global migration and development
discourse.
The ACP’s 2011 Human Mobility Report continues in the
same vein, explicitly proposing a suite of “migrationfriendly development policies” and “developmentfriendly migration policies” (ACP, 2011: 17). The report
initially advocates the “definitive abandonment” of the
root causes approach to migration on the grounds that
there is no evidence to support its basic premise. Almost
immediately, however, the report reverses its position,
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arguing that the root causes of migration remain a
challenge for ACP, and that eliminating them is a priority.
The root causes argument is then used to support the case
for greater development assistance.
The report identifies five key challenges for the ACP Group
of States: developing time- and cost-effective research
tools for analyzing the mobility-development nexus in the
ACP states, with particular emphasis on addressing the
scarcity of comprehensive, reliable and comparable data
on South-South migration; ensuring free, regulated and
secure mobility, including enhanced circular migration;
addressing environmentally induced migration, a “key
policy challenge” for ACP countries in the twentyfirst century; integrating human mobility in national
development strategies; and assuring the social cohesion,
respect for, and protection of migrants in ACP countries.
Many regional blocs of states have very limited migration
research capacity and rely quite heavily on outsourcing.
The ACP has developed a different and more coherent
approach by establishing the Intra-ACP Migration Facility,
which includes the ACP Observatory on Migration, both
based near the ACP Secretariat in Brussels. A private
consultancy firm was selected to establish the capacitybuilding components of the Facility and an IOM-led
consortium was awarded the Observatory tender. In the
two years since its public launch in Brussels in October
2010, the Observatory has achieved a great deal while
the rest of the Facility is yet to deliver on its mandate.
The Observatory has an active academic advisory board
with representation from 18 non-governmental research
organizations throughout the ACP regions and has
launched 27 separate research studies in 12 pilot countries
and regions on topics prioritized by those country
governments and regional organizations.
The Observatory manages an extremely active website
and is a regular participant in international gatherings on
migration and development (de Boeck, 2010). The primary
research focus of the Observatory is on South-South
migration, with a particular emphasis on remittances,
diasporas and other aspects of the migration-development
relationship. In a short space of time, the Observatory has
emerged as the leading global information and research
source on South-South mobility. It has also held technical
capacity-building workshops for government officials
on migration and development in all ACP regions, and
convenes national stakeholder workshops in the ACP
pilot countries. The success of the Observatory (which
is funded by the EU) contrasts sharply with the rather
limited achievements of the Facility. The future of both
is now under review in Brussels. What is clear is that
the Observatory’s research, policy and capacity-building
agenda is completely consistent with the idea of migration
as a development lever that currently preoccupies global
players such as the GFMD and the UN HLD.

Conclusions
A comparison of the separate migration-related resolutions
of the EU and ACP shows considerable overlap between the
two. The EU’s 2005 GAM and its 2011 Global Approach to
Migration and Mobility (GAMM) lay out an agenda which
certainly does not ignore the security “threat” of irregular
migration and trafficking, but places great emphasis on
the need for mobility partnerships and migration as a
“development lever” (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008). The fourth
pillar of the GAMM, entitled “maximising the development
impact of migration and mobility,” proposes a range of
related actions to “promote the beneficial development
outcomes of migration.” (EC, 2011: 6; 18). These actions
include remittances, diasporas and “the mainstreaming
of migration in development thinking” (EC, 2011: 19).
On the ACP side, as noted, migration is also framed as
a development issue in the 2006 Declaration on Asylum,
Migration and Mobility and the 2008 Brussels Resolution
on Migration and Development (ACP, 2006; 2008). When
both groups of states independently define migration as
a development lever in this way, there is considerable
common ground for a constructive conversation; however,
nothing in these programmatic statements is original or
unique to either the EU or the ACP. This is exactly the same
set of issues, policies and prescriptions that run through a
host of other initiatives including the GCIM, the UN HLD,
the GFMD and the GMG. In other words, to understand
the EU-ACP Group of States relationship, it is insufficient
simply to look at what these two groups of states say to
one another.
Why does the EU and ACP migration relationship focus
primarily on South-South migration and not migration
between the two blocs? This is a departure for the EU,
whose other initiatives and MME partnerships are
focussed on managing migration to the EU. As this paper
has shown, South-South migration has recently come
onto the global migration and development agenda and
is commanding increasing international attention. But that
does not, in itself, explain why the EU and the ACP should
make it a focus of cooperation. The importance of SouthSouth migration to the ACP countries seems self-evident,
but why would the EU take an interest?
First, there is the argument in the EU’s own GAMM
that “inter- and intra-regional migration in developing
regions far exceeds migration to the EU. This ‘south-south’
migration often brings benefits to migrants in the form of
better job opportunities and higher incomes than available
at home” (EU, 2011: 18). In other words, the EU takes a
broader position on the beneficial impacts of migration on
development and is prepared to support ACP initiatives on
South-South migration as part of its “aid package” to the
group. Second, and more instrumentally, by encouraging
greater intra- and inter-regional migration within the
South, the EU is, in fact, addressing root causes, facilitating
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alternative opportunities for migrants, and therefore, in its
calculation, reducing migration pressure on Europe.
By framing their dialogue on international migration
as a development rather than security issue, the EU
and the ACP have actually made considerable progress
since Cotonou. While points of disagreement remain,
particularly over revisions to Article 13, the relationship
is generally collegial and has defined common ground for
productive exchange and practical programming. The two
are now in regular dialogue over migration, and the EU
has largely funded both the Intra-ACP Migration Facility
and the influential ACP Observatory on Migration. This
rapprochement would have been inconceivable in the
1990s. This paper has attempted to explain this shift by
contextualizing it, first, within a broader seismic shift in
global migration governance, from conflict to cooperation,
and second, within a broader change in the global discourse
about migration itself.
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The global financial crisis has shown the need for stronger surveillance and
better foresight in financial governance. In 2009, the Group of Twenty (G20)
sought to bolster these by initiating the semi-annual EWE. Two international
institutions — the IMF and the FSB — were tasked with conducting the EWE.
Although the EWE is a critical mechanism for identifying systemic risks and
vulnerabilities, several problems constrain its effectiveness. The exercises
suffer from unclear goals, a lack of coordination, geographical separation,
insufficient organizational capacity and ad hoc procedures.
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• East Asian states do not perceive Arctic issues through an “Arctic” lens; rather,
they are deemed “maritime” or “polar” issues. This preference reflects a global,
rather than a regional, perspective on the Arctic. East Asian Arctic interests can
thus be pursued in a range of international fora; they do not need Arctic Council
membership to pursue their Arctic interests.

• The most important element of this integration will be to foster dialogue between
East Asian states and the Arctic Council’s six permanent participants (PPs) that
represent northern indigenous peoples.
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A Policy Mismatch: Canada and
the United States in the AsiaPacific Region
James Manicom

The United States and Canada, two of the world’s closest allies, have
reinvigorated their diplomatic and military postures toward the AsiaPacific region. On balance, however, Canada may not be an ideal
Pacific partner for the United States.

Post-2015
DeveloPment
AgenDA: goAls,
tArgets AnD
InDIcAtors
Special RepoRt

Post-2015 Development Agenda:
Goals, Targets and Indicators

Barry Carin et al.

This special report examines the targets for the UN Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) that have been met and considers the
global implications of the remaining unmet goals. The report reviews
a menu of indicators for the candidate goals to inform the future
process of selecting the post-2015 successors to the MDGs.
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